

Civil Military Relations in a Democratic Nigeria, 1999-2019

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the evolution of civil-military relations in Nigeria between 1999 and 2019, focusing on the extent to which democratic institutions and norms have influenced the relationship between civilian authorities and the military. It argues that while there have been significant improvements in Nigeria's democratic governance since the end of military rule in 1999, the country continues to grapple with challenges such as corruption, weak institutions, and insecurity that have implications for civil-military relations. The paper identifies key events and policies that have shaped the relationship between the civilian government and the military, including the adoption of a new constitution, the establishment of civilian control over the military, and the introduction of security sector reform initiatives. It also analyses the impact of civil-military relations on Nigeria's democratic governance, focusing on issues such as military involvement in politics, human rights abuses, and the role of the military in national development. It concludes that while progress has been made, there is still a need for sustained efforts to deepen democratic institutions, promote accountability and transparency, and enhance civilian control over the military in order to ensure stability and security in Nigeria. Finally, the research provides policy recommendations to strengthen democratic governance and civil-military relations in Nigeria. The study will contribute to the academic literature on civil-military relations, democratisation, and governance in Africa.

KEYWORDS: *Civilian Authorities, Military, Democratic Control, Agency Theory*

INTRODUCTION

Civil military relations which is the day to day strategic interaction between civilian authorities and the armed forces is an unending debate among scholars and stakeholders. Although most scholars have generally agreed that political and military matters are not separable, it is even more “impossible to separate military, democracy and politics completely when studying independent Africa” (Hoel 1). It is also a bit difficult to distinguish the roles of the military in a democratic and authoritarian systems of government. Before the end of the Second World War, the military did not always enjoyed favourable commendations from scholars. For instance, Machiavelli asserted that “Military man cannot be a good man” (Karabelias 6). while Voltaire observed that military is the “manifestation of brute force in rationalised form”.(Karabelias 6) And Samuel Adams was relatively more objective when he stated that “though standing army is necessary but it is always dangerous to the liberties of the people” (qtd. in Cushing 250). The military have become a necessary evil.

In African history, the military was always a tool in the hands of monarchies and traditional leaders. But with the independence of African countries, especially during the Cold War, African militaries took centre stage to become principals in most African countries. There have always been friction between African militaries, and the political elites and the society on the one hand In Nigeria specifically, the military usurped power thereby subjugating their principals (Political elite) for several decades. Since the independence of Nigeria in 1960, the military have ruled the country for thirty-one years with ten military interventions. That is, ten coup d'etat, which witnessed six successful ones. However, since 1999 when the military handed over power to the civilians, civil military relations in Nigeria seems to be relatively stable because there has not been any successful coup d'etat since then.

It is generally agreed that moving from a military rule to a civilian rule takes decades to perfect. As observed by Karabelias (1998), "while in the transition period, a relatively stable configuration of political institution with democratic characteristics could be established, such a regime cannot be referred to as a democratic one"(Karabelias 9). This transition period that Elewomawu (2019) called "militarised democracy"(Elewomawu 8) is observable in Nigeria presently. While the military see the Nigerian political elites as indiscipline, but because of the long years of military rule, which was accompanied by molestation and corruption, Nigerians find it difficult to trust the military to stay out of politics. This might also create hatred and neglect towards the military. Therefore, there seems to be an oscillatory resentment between the Nigerian Armed Forces and the civilians. This paper tries to assess the civil military relations in Nigeria two decades after the military returned to their barracks. This research uses a case study design, which relies on qualitative method of both primary and secondary data. There is also a chronological examination of the antecedent of civil military relations and an analysis of the antecedents of civil military relations in pre-colonial period.

Definition of Terms

This study engages several concepts that will be recurring throughout. Therefore early explanations of these concepts will ensure smooth reading and comprehension.

Civil Military Relations (or CMR) have multiple views but are all interrelated. Clande Weleh sees CMR as an interaction that exists between the armed forces as an institution and factors of the society in which it is embedded (qtd. in Yoroms 139). While Emizet (2000) views it as the patterns of influence, control, subordination between the armed forces and the wider social environment (Emizet 204). That is, the balance of power between the military and civilian branches of government, which exhibit supremacy and guidance of the civilian populace over the military. A more relevant definition to this research is that civil military relations in a democratic state describes a situation where the military establishment is obedient, by accepting subordination, to elected civilian authorities with the constitution clearly defining the spheres of both.

Civil Military Problematique is the dilemma that exists in the sphere, power and resources available to the military. It entails the balancing of two significant issues: firstly, a country is expected to develop a strong armed forces good enough to protect the country from external aggression or in case of war. However, despite this maximum availability of powers and resources, the military must be able to retrain itself from subjugating its community, which it has sworn to protect. It is also about increasing or decreasing the scope of delegation and monitoring the military's behaviour in the context of such delegation.

The government (Civilian Authorities) is a concept meant to represent the highest political decision making authority in a (democratic) country

The Military also known as Armed Forces (and officers corps) is a group of people provided with powers, arms and ammunition for the purpose of protecting the country from external aggression and where necessary employed to ensure internal security. They could be in the army, navy or air force.

Military Coup/ military intervention could be coup d'état or palace coup. It is a situation where the military institution overthrows the government of a country.

Objective Control illustrates balance of power. In his epic piece "The Soldier and the State", Samuel P. Huntington emphasises the importance of a "high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the limits of their professional competence, the effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and military policy; the recognition and acceptance by the leadership of an area of professional competence and autonomy for the military; as a result, the minimisation of military intervention in policies and of political intervention by the military"(Huntington, 1996 3-4).

Subjective control relies basically on legal and institutional mechanisms to control the military. It usually 'civilianise' the military by making them a reflection of the State. Government reduces their powers by downsizing them and enforcing them to carry out operations that are normally civilian responsibilities.

Parliamentary oversight refers to the accountability of the executive including the ministry of defence, which oversees the affairs of the military to the elected parliament of a country. It includes oversight of the policies, personnel, operations, financials and acquirement of equipment. However, for parliamentary oversight to be effective, there must be adequate expertise on military matters within the parliament and a well-functioning standing committee on security and defence issues on the parliament.

Civil Military Relations Theories/Models

Classic Liberal Theory: This model can also be referred to as Western classical model, separation model, or military effectiveness approach. The point of departure in the discussion of civil military relations is "The Soldier and the State" by Samuel P. Huntington (1957), which emphasises this model. He opines that civilian authorities and the military should be totally separated without any interference from any side based on the principle of 'objective civilian control'. He insists that "officership is strongest and most effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideals; it is weakest and most defective when it falls short of that ideal"(Huntington, 1957 7-18). The focus here is for civilian leaders to determine the objective and broad policy guidance upfront. The military offers options to achieve these goals and provide its assessment of risk for each of these options. That is, the government makes the key decisions and the armed forces execute the guidance with minimal political oversight or 'meddling',(Rapp 13) rendering the military politically sterile and neutral. Morris Janowitz's "Professional Soldier" (1960) also insists on military professionalism and effectiveness but he seems to lean more towards subjective civilian control. Janowitz believes that the military can be regarded as a pressure group within a state but can be adequately controlled through 'meaningful' integration with civilian values. As plausible as this model is, the major challenge is its failure to recognize the fact that it is impossible to separate

political and military affairs particularly at the highest levels of policy making. Moreover this model does not take into cognizance the historical and cultural experiences of each society other than the western world. Nascent democracies such as African countries will struggle to perfect this model.

Communist-Authoritarian Model: This model is predicated on strong ideological commitment of the people and overlordship of the leader. This theory is totally subjective because the military is incorporated into governance. It is not guided by any legal instrument. The military acts at the dictates of the dictator. The military is tasked with the responsibility to maintain the hegemony of the ruling party over state and society. The military is ipso facto politically oriented. As observed by Permluter that "the military serve as a guardian of the heroic party and ruling political ideology"(qtd. in Yoroms 145). The Soviet Union, China, Tanzania, Cuba e.t.c are examples of states that have or are still practising this model. While this model creates an alliance between the political elite and the military institution, it usurps the liberty of the citizenry while limiting democratic competition and participation. The people (electorate) who have the highest stake in the country are usually ostracized and subjugated.

Concordance theory: This is a relatively new model proposed by Rebecca L. Schiff. This argues that a "major conclusion of current CMR theories is that militaries should remain physically and ideologically separated from political institutions"(Schiff 7). But this should not be mandatory or sacrosanct because the unique historical and cultural experiences should be the determinants of the type of CMR to adopt in any society. This model is based upon three partners; the armed forces and the personnel, the political leadership (i.e the government) and the citizen (the electorate, ordinary people and civil societies). It also rests on four indicators; one, the social composition of the officer corps. This has to do with the broad representation of most of the constituencies of the country. Citing the example of the caste system in India, Schiff stresses that total representation is not a prerequisite but agreement over composition of the officer corps (Schiff 13). Secondly, the political decision making process. This indicator means the institutional organisations of the community, which affect the operations of the military. These includes the size, budget, equipment, materials and structure of the military, which are decided upon by open parliament, closed cabinets, special committees and political elites. In many countries there is a close partnership or in some cases, collusion between the military and industry that is known as 'military industrial complex'. Such a partnership may have the support of the citizenry. The most important thing is agreement must be reached by the three partners.

Thirdly, recruitment method. This entails the enlistment of the citizens into the military. This could be coercive or persuasive. Coercive recruitment involves forceful engagement of citizens through conscription and taxation to meet the needs of the military. This method could lead to friction between the military and the citizens. But the persuasive recruitment entails citizens accepting to sacrifice for the sake of security, patriotism, other national issues. They voluntarily offer themselves for enlistment. This will definitely lead to agreement among the three partners. The last indicator of concordance theory is the military style. "Military style deals directly with the human and cultural elements of the armed forces. How the military looks, the overt and subtle signals it conveys, the rituals it displays -- these are all part of a deep and nuanced relationship among soldiers, citizens and the polity" (Schiff 17). This indicator is unique to concordance model and a bit ambivalent. Schiff claims that if there is a general acceptance among the partners with respect to these indicators then the livelihood of military intervention is diminished.

However this model is unable to provide answers to question possessed by Anderson (1998) such as; how will the four indicators work together? What is the degree of agreement or disagreement required to prevent military intervention or precipitate a coup? How do we know if concordance has been achieved? Concordance theory is also hindered by its empirical studies. Rebecca Schiff made her conclusion based on two states (India and Israel) that have had long years of uninterrupted democracies. This model needs to be tested on countries that have had multiple military coups, especially in Africa.

Collaborative partnership model: This is a theory that was tested specifically in Southern Africa by Rocky Williams in 1998. This model advocates for a partnership between objective control and subjective control. It claims that the concept of a political soldier should be re-examined and received to ensure involvement of the officer corps in political decisions. Collaborative partnership believes that the scope of CMR needs to be expanded to incorporate non-institutional actors and mechanism into its orbits as well as a consideration of the role which both police agencies, intelligence services and in some cases, private security companies may play in either ensuring or undermining civil military relations. The challenge with this model is that it is open for abuse by political elites and support military elites against their against their paymasters (the citizenry). Also, government decisions might be easily undermined by the military because of the excessive power it may possess.

Pre-Colonial History of Civil Military Relations in Nigerian Territory

This research dives into the past to explain the CMR model adopted by the states within the current Nigerian territory before the advent of the colonialists. This will help validate the theoretical framework adopted for this research and for Nigeria presently. Four states have been studied for this purpose. They are Kanem–Borno Empire, Oyo Empire, Sokoto Caliphate and Igbo Confederacy. Kanem–Borno Empire was one of the earliest Empires in Nigerian territory. It reigned between the 10th and the 18th centuries reaching its peak in the middle of the 17th century. At its peak, it had expanded and exercised control over the Hausaland in West Africa, the lake Chad environment as far as the salt mining environs of Bilma in the North and was bordered by the Kwararafa Kingdom in the South East (Lavers 187-204). The hierarchy of the administration starts with the Mai and his household at the top followed by the council of leaders, which was a collection of the functionaries in the capital. Among these officials were Waziri (prime minister), Talib (secretary), qadi (chief judge), Kaigama, (army commander) etc. Immediately following this council are feudal lords. The feudal lords were also military commanders. Their titles were Maina and Kogena. Maina was for a commander from the royal house (i.e a prince) and Kogena was given to a commander who was not blue blooded. Governors of the various provinces were next in the pyramid of administration in Kanem-Borno Empire. The empire was divided into West headed by Galadima, East headed by the Mestrema, who was also warden of the king's household, North by the Yerima and the south led by the Kaigama, who was also Commander-in-Chief. These provincial rulers also served as leaders of the four main divisions of the imperial army. At the bottom of the cadre were the district/ local chiefs. The Mai (Monarch) and his household gave directives to the military through the Kaigama who must obey irrespective of the challenges. The Mai and council of ministers were unquestionably supreme.

Oyo Empire reigned between the 14th and the 19th century. At its peak, it was bounded in the North by the River Niger, to the South of the Mangrove swamps and lagoons, the Benin Kingdom

in the East and the West by the present day frontiers of Togo, and receiving tributes from Borgu, Nupe and part of Dahomey in modern Benin Republic (Akinlogbin and Ayandele 135). The system of government in the traditional Yoruba society was a loose monarchical arrangement and highly democratic. At the top of the government was the Alafin and his household who administered and directed the affairs of the state. This he did in consultation with the oyo mesi (council of state) who were the kingmakers with legislative and judicial powers. The members were representatives of the clans within the capital and other state administrators like the kankafo (army commander). The oyo mesi was headed by the bashorun who could be regarded as the prime minister and next in command to the Alafin. The ogboni cult was the third arm of government. It checked the excesses of both the Alaafin and the oyomesi. Members were reputable citizens who had experience through their age. They serve as mediator between the Alafin and the oyomesi. They could be regarded as social political and religious leaders as they consulted the gods on behalf of the state. It was headed by Oluwo. Among the institution of the "Alaafinate", oyo mesi and ogboni cult, none was more important than the other. They were more or less equals. The Alaafin could not tyrannically take the state decision without the authority of the oyo mesi else the Alafin would be made to commit suicide and the ogboni led by the oluwo was the mediator or arbiter. The army was also stationed outside the capital and was completely subject to the directives of Alaafin and the council of state.

Sokoto caliphate at its peak encompassed the entire Hausaland in Nigeria, some part of North-East of Nigeria and some part of Yorubaland, receiving tribute from Nupe, Igala Kingdom and virtually all the present day Middle Belt of Nigeria (Abubakar 303-304). It reigned between 1806 and 1906. The Empire was a confederate state with strong religious loyalty. It had no standing army but received military contributions from emirate under its jurisdiction. The sultan was the supreme leader assisted by the council of chiefs, which comprised of the Waziri, Galadima, Magajin Rafi, Magajin Gari, Turakin Sokoto, Sarkin Malamai and the secretary. The commander of the army of the centre, Sarkin Yaki was not even a member. Here, the military was totally subservient and only carry out tasks delegated to it by the Caliph (monarch). In the Eastern part of Nigeria, the Igbo who existed in various autonomous territories had no standing armies. The village were run by elders of the communities. These groups of elders came together to deliberate on community issues when necessary and directives are issued to the youths who go round the villages to conscript able-bodied men (voluntarily) to form armies when needed.

Invariably, Nigerian communities from time immemorial have practised similar CMR. The principal-agent model has been the CMR theory that Nigerians have been accustomed to. That is, the civilian authorities have always been the super principal of the military (agents). Therefore, the agency theory is the perfect fit for Nigerian CMR today. The military will have to continue to subject themselves to the dictates of the civilian government. This democratic control will also ensure professionalism and effectiveness of the Nigerian military

Theoretical framework

This research is guided by agency theory. This theory which is synonymous with principal agent model in economics was introduced into civil military relations discourse in 2003 by Peter Feaver. In his book "Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations", Feaver opines that "agency theory provides a unique, realistic and empirically stable perspective on problems of cooperative effort" (Eisenhardt 72). Using the American CMR as a case study, he defines agency theory as "a strategic interaction within a hierarchical setting with the civilians assuming the role of

the principal and the military acting as the agent" (Feaver 15-20). That is, the principal makes the decision and delegates to its agents to implement.

Agency theory presents the process involved in the government achieving objective civilian control despite the different preferences between the military and the civilian. Peter Feaver divides the preferences of civilian into functional and relational. The functional preference involves the strategies employed by the government to enable the military do tasks delegated to it and work to the fullest extent of its duty while maintaining competence (Feaver 61). The relational goals includes the desires of the civilian to make the key policy decisions, to decide when it should make decisions, and the military must avoid any behaviour that may undermine the supremacy of the government (Feaver 61). This is what Richard Kohl expressed when he said civilian control means that the elected leadership and those whom they appoint, have both the right and the authority to be wrong (Collins 178; Feaver 6). Absolute compliance means the military does everything the civilian delegates to it. While extreme disobedience results in military coup.

The preference of the military revolves around these goals; how the armed forces will be used in pursuit of national policy, how the behaviour of the armed forces will be interpreted and the monitoring mechanism of the relationship. The military can undermine the authority of the civilians by presenting an inflated estimate of a military operation cost, engaging in unauthorised public protests, leaks or courting other political actors and through bureaucratic foot-dragging (Feaver 68). Feaver proposes some oversight mechanisms for effective civilian control which include rules of engagement, mission order, standing orders, contingency plans, screening and selection of personnel and advisors, third party monitors, revisiting the original task and punishment (Feaver 75-86). This punishment could be in forms of budget cuts, military justice, unwelcome monitoring arrangement, discharge or retirement, and extralegal civilian action to include verbal rebukes (Feaver 91-92).

The bottom line is, agency theory assume that national choices determines the relationship between the military and its civilian principal. The civilian principal is superior while the armed force is the subservient agent. The civilian principal includes the executive who gives direct command and legislature with indirect oversight and other sub-organs under them. The principal agent model is applicable and recommended to Nigeria for several reasons. Firstly, the 1999 constitution that is still in operation subjects the military to the control of the civilians based on the presidential democracy of the United States. Secondly, historically, before the colonisation of Nigeria, Nigerian states have always employed the military as 'a tool of the state' while the monarchies and political elites were the principal. Also, has observed by Feaver, "civilians are morally and politically more competent to make decisions even if they do not possess the relevant technical competence in the form of expertise...Although the expert may possibly understand the issue better, the expert (military) is not in a position to determine the value the people will attach to different issue outcome" (Feaver 6). Furthermore, democracy does not accept the subjugation of elected officials. The citizens through their elected representatives are superior in a democracy. Finally, subjugating themselves to civilian authorities attracts more benefits than costs for the armed forces.

The Military in Nigerian Politics

During the first republic, the armed forces of Nigeria mainly participated in ceremonial duties, routine training and parades. The military also assisted the Police when there was a need for it to maintain law and order. It participated in United Nations Organisation's peacekeeping mission in

Congo 1960-1964. A large majority of the population was recruited from the hinterland. This is because the British colonists believed that they will be able to control anti-colonial protests since they had no strong connection with people in the urban centres. At independence in 1960, Nigerian military had only 7,500 soldiers with 228 British officers and 50 Nigerian officers. But by 1966 when the first coup took place, the population had altered to over 15,000 soldiers with 517 officers (all Nigerians) (Hoel 29).

Nigeria has witnessed ten coups with only six successful (Elewomawu 6) The successful coups include that of January 15th 1966 led by Major Kaduna Nzegwu but it was Colonel C.N.J. Aguiyi-Ironsi who ruled the country. There was the counter-coup of 29th June 1966 that brought General Yakubu Gowon to power. After nine years, another coup brought Gen. Murtala Muhammed to power on 30th July 1975. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo assumed power after a failed coup claimed the life of Gen. Muhammed on 13th February 1976. Obasanjo restored Nigeria to civilian rule on 1st October 1979. After four years of civilian rule, the military returned to power through a coup led by Gen. Muhammadu Buhari on 31st December 1983. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida overthrew Buhari on 27th August 1985 and ruled for eight years, organised a failed transition programme before handing over to an Interim Committee led by Chief Ernest Shonekan, leaving the door open for Gen. Sani Abacha to take over power on 17th November 1993. His mysterious death in 1998 brought Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar to power who organised a successful transition programme and handed over power to former Head of State, Olusegun Obasanjo who won the presidential elections on 29th May 1999.

The journey or worthless interference of the armed forces into Nigerian politics "has its structural roots in colonialism itself, whose authority was predicated upon conquest, coercion and violence as the security forces were systematically used to impose foreign domination... Under colonial rule, the military was an instrument of social and political oppression and repression" (Matlosa and Zounmenou 95). The military of Nigeria has always hide behind several problems to justify their interventions. Some of these problems are corruption, maladministration, tribalism and ethnicity, election malpractices, molestation of opponents, indiscriminate killings, electoral crises, poor and inadequate infrastructure, religious bigotry, economic hardship, negligence of the military institution, indiscipline among civilians etcetera. All these were still ironically more pervasive during military rule.

Consequently, the military has also left indelible marks in the history of Nigeria. Some are positive but majorly negative. One of the major consequences of the military intervention in Nigerian politics is the militarisation of Nigerian psyche. Twenty years after the military handed over to civilians, Nigeria still epitomises 'militarised democracy' (Elewomawu 9). That is, molestation of opponents, violent electioneering, abuse of power and corruption. Secondly, the suppression of human and civil rights of the citizens. Abuse of the fundamental human rights of the citizens is still pervasive in Nigeria today. The military introduced it and the civilians have not been able to eradicate it. Also, there is the perpetual distortion and incrimination of the political process such as election malpractices, violent electioneering and kidnappings of opponents. Nigeria is still unable to recover from the mismanagement of the economy by the military. Lastly, the indiscipline and extravagant lifestyle that the armed forces encouraged during their reign has become a normal way of life in Nigeria, which is promoting corruption in all facets of Nigeria.

Democratic Control in Nigerian Civil Military Relations Framework

Several issues have led to frictions within the Nigerian civil military relations. Some of these problems include long period of military rule that has led to the militarisation of Nigerians' psyche, misuse of the armed forces in internal security maintenance especially during electoral process and protests, and human rights abuses suffered by Nigerians during military rule. Also democratic rule discourages and curtails the ambitions and misuse of resources by the armed forces, pervasiveness of corruption and corrupt practices in both military and civilian rules, and the supposed discipline nature of the military as against the seemingly indiscipline of the civilian authorities. Despite these constraints, Nigeria has set up measures to enhance and enforce democratic subjugation of the military in the last two decades since the start of this democratic dispensation. The reasons for this democratic control cannot be overemphasised. Democratic (or objective civilian) control helps to prevent excesses of the armed forces in carrying out their functions, since it can damage the reputation of the government. Democratic control will also prevent fifth columnists, prevent contamination of the military with political, ethnic or religious sentiments. And it will ensure mutual understanding between civilian and the military.

The present constitutional framework of the Nigerian CMR is based on the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, which emphasises dual principal (executive and legislative) for the agent (the military). The constitution designates the president as the Commander-in-chief of the armed forces with executive powers on appointment, promotion and discipline of the military leaders (Chiefs of army, navy and Air force). Most importantly, the president is empowered to delegate tasks to any member of the military without recourse to its (military) hierarchical command structure. While the legislature (National Assembly) has the power to determine the composition, maintenance, equipping and training of the military. The constitution also specially stipulate all operational roles of the military as protecting the Nigerian state from external threat as its primary function and its secondary role, which is assisting the police in providing internal security when necessary. (Section 217-218 Constitution of FRN, 85-86) It also makes provision for two bodies (National Defence Council and National Security Council) that are to be the "unofficial venue". That is, the bridge between the civilian authorities and the military and other security agencies. (Second Schedule, Sections 16 and 17, Sections 25 and 26, Constitution of FRN, 1999: 143-144 &146)

Part of the oversight functions of the legislature is constituting a defence committee with members who have adequate experience in military affairs. However, this function has not been properly carried out due to inexperience, negligence and politicisation of defence and security matters. Despite Finer's claim that the military is in "no worse a moral position than any other departments of civil administration...to persuade the government to their point of held" (Karabelias 6) and Guy Pauker asserting that the military is the best group to ensure political and societal stability, (Pauker 343) it is obvious that the limitation of the armed forces inherent in their profession will have minimal contribution to the broad economic development" (Janowitz 80) of any country as observed in Nigeria. Therefore, the democratic subjection of the military is undebatable.

Another significant stakeholder in the CMR of Nigeria is the international community. International community such is United Nations Organisation, African Union, the Economic Community of West African State, USA, USSR, Britain, European Union and others have always played decisive roles in the CMR of Nigeria. The Cold War (1945 - 1991) affected the relationship between Nigeria military and civilian authorities. Britain, USA and USSR capitalised on the obvious weaknesses of

the new independent Nigeria to influence some elements of the military against civilian government. Of the ten military corps in Nigeria, nine of them happened during the Cold War. Only the 1993 Abacha coup could have received less influence from the international community. However, since the 'official end' of the Cold War, the international community especially USA have discouraged military intervention world over. USA has continually advocated for military effectiveness model with an emphasis on agency theory. Consequently, Nigeria has received several military reforms (training and doctrine) assistance from USA and Britain. These assistance are based on the civilian government of Nigeria being able to exercise adequate control of the armed forces by improving her military professionalism and help build the capacity of the armed forces to effectively respond to crisis within Nigerian and also contribute to international missions. After granting assistance worth \$27.5 million to Nigeria in 1999, the United States declared that “a primary goal of the US military’s engagement with the Nigerian military since May 1999 has been to help solidify the democratic transition by strengthening civilian oversight of its military through an action plan that was jointly developed, agreed to and funded by the US and Nigerian governments” (qtd. in Tafida 233).

Since 1999, based on the unique intricacies inherent in Nigerian CMR, the government has come up with important military (defence) reforms and decisions to enhance the principal – agent model of CMR in Nigeria. One of such reforms is increase in military expenditure to promote military effectiveness. The government increased military spending from ₦45.4 billion in 1999 to ₦122 billion by 2007 (qtd. in Tafida 194). This was meant to provide for training (home and abroad), modernise, equipment and comfortable barracks accommodation. This has increased gradually to over ₦600 billion as at 2018 (Nigeria-Military expenditure, knoema.com) in order to actualise these reforms. Although, the government tried to reduce the size and budget of the military in the first decade of the present democracy, due to some exigencies such as Boko Haram insurgency in the Far North, the size and spending have increased. The present manpower strength of the Nigerian Armed Forces in over 120,000 compared to 77,000 in 1998 (Nigeria Military Strength, globalfirepower.com).

The Nigerian government has also capitalised on the orientational shift within the senior circle of the military from political ambitions to military professionalism. In 1999, the government retired all officers who have tasted political power or/and involved in any coup before. It also established the Ministry of Defence with civilian ministers to also act as a bridge between the military and the civilian authorities. In order to institutionalise democratic control over the military, the government based all its reforms on these seven basic principles The armed forces should accept the constitution as the supreme guide for the military; the military must also accept the elected president as their Commander-in-Chief and the supremacy of other elected officials over those appointed; they should accept the supremacy of civilian decision making in matters related to defence budget; accept the leadership of civilians in the defence ministry; must continually accept the supremacy of the laid down political and strategic goals by civilian authorities; the need to apply civilised principles to all military trials and investigations and to accept the rights of civilian leadership to exercise judicial review or ruling by military court martial (Obasanjo, 1999).

In line with these, the government initiated a series of reorientation programmes to re-professionalise the Nigerian Armed Forces, which entailed training, retraining and re-indoctrination particularly the military leadership. The government also dealt decisively with any form of shirking (i.e resisting directives by the agent). A conspicuous example was Gen. Victor Malu (Chief of

army) who was summarily retired along with other chiefs when he publicly disagreed with civilian directives in 2002 (Daily Trust Newspaper, Thursday 26th April 2001: 1-2). Another reform the government embarked on was the legal framework of the military enacted in 1994 titled "The Armed forces degree No. 105 of 1993". The National Assembly amended it and re-titled it "The Armed Forces Act (CAP. A20)" in 2004. This law gives details of the establishment, composition and command of the military. It also defines the rights, privileges and duties of military personnel coupled with its conditions of service, operational jurisdiction and application of military laws in issues of professional misconduct within the military (The Armed Forces Act, 2004: 88-94).

Lastly, the Ministry of Defence drafted the first defence policy of Nigeria in June 2006. The objectives of this policy among others include Protection of Nigeria's sovereignty, citizens, values, culture, interests, resources and territory against external threats, provide defence as well as strategic advice and information to government, participant in disaster management and humanitarian relief operations at home and abroad, ensure security and stability in the West African sub-region through collective security, contribute to international peace and security etc (FRN, National Defence Policy, 2006). The mission of the Ministry of Defence is "to generate, employ and sustain combat-ready, integrated and rapidly deployable armed forces, capable of quick assembly to meet varying contingencies both at home and abroad" (FRN, National Defence Policy 17). These policies, the liberal-democratic stance of USA, coupled with the reorientation programmes of civil society organisations and the determination of the electorate to democratise the country, the civil military relations of Nigeria has swung in favour of the civilian authorities.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This study examined one of the most contentious issues in the history of independent Nigeria; the civil military relations. The military have spent more time in political leadership than the civilians. Military leadership in Nigeria was convinced that it is more discipline than the civilian authorities. As such, they assumed that they are more credible to rule the country. However, since liberal democratic system has become the universally accepted mode of governance, the Nigerian armed forces had to go back to their barracks in 1999. After presenting the definition of important terms of this study, this paper reviewed literature especially commentary on the various available models and theories of civil military relations. Based on the historical antecedents of pre-colonial Nigerian states of Nigeria, the theoretical framework adopted by the study for Nigeria is agency theory (principal agency model). This paper also reviewed the various issues surrounding the civil military relations of Nigeria since 1999 when the military handed over power. Despite some hitches, the civilian authorities, with the assistance of the international community, civil society organisation, the resolve of the electorate and the orientation shift among the military leadership circle, has been able to have objective (democratic) civilian control over the armed forces

Despite the need for civilian control, Nigerian civilian authorities should also consider the best military advice while arriving at a defence decision. And military leadership should avoid political sub-abnegation. This is because effective military support to the nation's senior civilian leaders requires senior military leaders who are politically astute without engaging in domestic politics, and who have learnt the non-military complexities of policy implementation (Rapp 17). To sustain this cordial civil military relations in Nigeria, political leaders should try to gain a better understanding of the capacities, limitations and bluntness of the armed forces. Although, defence budget has

continually increased in the last decade, this is deceptive because it is used to execute the war against the insurgency in the Far North. The welfare of the soldiers have not significantly improved. Adequate living welfare needs to be provided for members of the armed forces.

The government must also see and use the military as a legitimate tool for democratising Nigeria and not misuse the soldiers as oppressive tools. There must also be a restoration of the merit system for promotion in the military except in exceptional cases. The civilians should also not meddle in the operational matters and command chain of the military. Furthermore, the orientation programmes of the military should continue with regular lectures, workshops, seminars and symposia, review of military curriculum to accommodate democratic values and practice, and defence policies as a whole. One significant issue that must be improved on is the enlightenment of civilian leaders on military matters. Inexperience and ineffectiveness of defence committee members of the National Assembly is a fatal hindrance to objective civilian control. Too many changes and politicisation of the membership is also a debilitating problem. The National Assembly must retain and perpetually enlighten members of the committee to be able to enhance military effectiveness and civilian control.

Government should also organise study tours and supervisions of defence military projects, accommodations and equipment to continually review their decisions on better civil military relations. CMR models such as concordance, collaborative partnership and communist-authoritarian will continually create friction between the military and the civilian in Nigeria because Nigerians already have a mentality of principal agent model. The military are established tools of the state just like civil (or public) servants. Therefore, if the mainstream civil servants are expected to be apolitical or neutral politically, the armed forces of Nigeria, which is also like the civil service must be politically neutral and acquiescence to its principal. That is, the Nigerian military must deliberately and perpetually be a diligent and loyal agent of its principal, the civilian authorities.

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